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Chapter I
Models of sex ratio evolution
Jon Seger & J. William Stubblefield
1.1 1 Summary 1.2 I Introduction
Our understanding  of sex ratio  evolution de­
pends strongly on models th a t identify: (1 ) con­
strain ts on the production o f m ale and female 
offspring, and (2) fitness consequences entailed 
by the production  o f  different attainable brood 
sex ratios. Verbal and m athem atical argum ents 
by, am ong others, Darwin, Dtising, Fisher, and 
Shaw and M ohler established the fundam ental 
principle th a t m em bers o f  the m inority  sex tend 
to  have higher fitness th an  m em bers of the m a­
jo rity  sex. They also outlined how various eco­
logical, dem ographic and  genetic variables m ight 
affect the details o f  sex-allocation strategies by 
m odifying bo th  the constraints and the fitness 
functions. M odern sex-allocation research is de­
voted largely to  the exploration of such effects, 
w hich connect sex ratios to  m any o ther aspects 
o f the  biologies of m any species. The models 
used in  this work are of two general kinds: (1 ) 
expected-future-fitness or tracer-gene models th a t 
ask how a given sex allocation will affect the 
fu tu re  frequencies o f neu tra l genes carried by 
the allocating parent, and (2) explicit population- 
genetic models th a t consider the dynamics of 
alleles th a t determ ine alternative paren tal sex al­
location phenotypes. Each kind of m odel has dif­
feren t strengths and weaknesses, and both  are 
often essential to the  full elucidation o f a given 
problem .
Males and females are produced in  approxi­
m ately equal num bers in  m ost species w ith  sepa­
rate  sexes, regardless o f the m echanism  o f sex de­
term ination , and in  m ost herm aphroditic  species 
individuals expend approxim ately equal effort on 
m ale and female reproductive functions. W hy 
should this be so? Sex allocation is a frequency- 
dependent evolutionary gam e (Charnov 1982, 
M aynard Smith 1982, Bulmer 1994). The basic 
principle th a t explains w hy balanced sex ratios 
evolve so often was described in  a lim ited and 
tentative way by Darwin (1871), fa rth e r  devel­
oped by Karl Dtising (1883, 1884) and several 
early tw entie th  century  authors, and th en  sum ­
m arized concisely by RA Fisher in  The Genetical 
Theory of Natural Selection (1930) (Edwards 1998, 
2000). Subsequent work has generalized the  p rin ­
ciple and extended it  to  cover a great variety of 
special circum stances to  w hich Fisher’s elegant 
bu t elem entary account does no t apply.
Sex allocation is now  rem arkably well under­
stood, and this understanding  is often hailed as 
a trium ph  o f evolutionary theoiy. However, to 
say th a t the fundam entals may be well under­
stood is no t to say th a t all o f the in teresting  and 
im portan t discoveries have been made. Despite 
its focus on a seem ingly sim ple and singular phe­
nom enon, sex-allocation research has become a 
rich and diverse enterprise th a t makes contact
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w ith  m any aspects o f biology in  a wide range of 
taxa. The field has continued to yield surprising 
phenom ena and novel insights, and the pace 
o f discovery shows no signs o f slowing. The 
book you are now holding illustrates the  field’s 
am azing richness and describes m any o f the 
cu rren t research frontiers. But because the field 
is so large, no t even a m ulti-authored volume 
can cover it all. Reviews o f varying em phasis 
and scope have been provided by Williams
(1979), Charnov (1982, 1993), Trivers (1985), 
Clutton-Brock (1986, 1991), Clutton-Brock and 
Iason (1986), Karlin and Lessard (1986), Nonacs 
(1986), Bull and Charnov (1988), Frank (1990,
1998), W rensch and Ebbert (1993), Bulmer (1994), 
Godfray (1994), Bourke and Franks (1995), Crozier 
and Pamilo (1996), Herre et al. (1997), Klinkhamer 
et al. (1997), Hewison and Gaillard (1999) and 
West et al. (2000), am ong m any o ther authors.
In this chapter we in troduce the central prin­
ciple o f sex ratio  evolution and some o f the  tech­
niques used to m odel it. We em phasize basic con­
cepts and issues th a t appear (at least implicitly) 
in  all models, and we a ttem pt to place these ideas 
in  the ir historical context.
1.3 Models have always been 
central
M athem atical models are, and always have been, 
central to the  study o f sex ratios. Indeed, it  
is hard  to  th ink  o f any biological field, associ­
ated w ith  specific phenotypes, th a t is m ore thor­
oughly model-driven. Population genetics is also 
model-driven in  this sense, o f course, bu t its m od­
els concern genes in general; the genes o f popula­
tion  genetics are abstracted, intentionally, from  
any particu lar class o f phenotypic effects.
The sex ratio, by contrast, could hardly be 
m ore concrete. This is som etim es forgotten, be­
cause every sexual species has a sex ratio  (or at 
least allocation to m ale and female functions). 
But in  fact the phenotype a t issue (the relative 
num bers of two reproductive morphs) is in  m any 
ways an extrem ely particu lar and m undane fact
o f life. Even so, biologists from  Darwin to the 
present have sensed an underlying generality  of 
principle. They have spoken of ‘th e ’ sex ratio 
(singular), as if  to understand  the sex ratio  o f any 
one species would be (obviously) to  understand  
the sex ratios o f m any others. Today we have good 
reasons to view ‘th e ’ sex ratio  in  this way, bu t 
m ost of these were unknow n to Darwin. N onethe­
less, he in itia ted  the m odern discussion o f sex ra­
tios, in  The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation 
to Sex (1871), by describing the outlines o f a quan­
titative, dynam ical model th a t includes m ost of 
the essential features o f everything th a t would 
follow. Formal m athem atical analysis cam e later, 
as did d irect connections to genetics, and these 
developments gave rise to  a richness th a t Darwin 
could no t have anticipated. Even so, he saw th a t 
there m ust be a simple underlying principle to 
be elucidated and then  (by im plication) applied 
to  a broad diversity o f special cases. We still see 
the  subject in  this way.
The principle emerges from  an analysis o f the 
reproductive consequences o f an  elem entary bu t 
generic model o f reproduction. The principle is 
then  applied and extended by specifying details 
th a t may be left vague in  the generic model, 
w hich is to  say by m odifying various im plicit and 
explicit assum ptions o f the model.
Sex ratio m odelling has been an  extrem ely 
successful enterprise. This success can be at­
tribu ted  to three features o f the relationship 
betw een the models and reality. First, the  rele­
vant biological factors can be specified and repre­
sented appropriately in  simple m athem atical ex­
pressions. Second, these factors can be observed 
and m easured in  nature , and m any o f them  vary 
both  w ith in  and am ong species in  ways th a t are 
predicted to  change the sex ratios produced by 
different individuals or species. Third, the fit­
ness differences arising from  sex ratio  behaviours 
are often large, so real organism s are expected 
to show sex ratio  m odifications a t least qualita­
tively like those predicted by theory, and in  fact 
they often do. In this chapter we focus m ainly 
on the  first o f these three features of sex ratio  
research: how biology is represented in  models, 
and how the models are then  analysed to uncover
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predictions th a t m ight (at least in  principle) be 
tested  in  nature. O ther chapters m ore thoroughly 
explore the  variations th a t have been incorpo­
ra ted  in to  sex ratio  models, and the ways in  
w hich experim ental and observational data have 
been used to  test these models.
1.4 I Darwin’s argument
As its title  implies, The Descent o f Man and Selection 
in Relation to Sex (1871) is really two books m erged 
in to  one. The book on hum an  origins begins w ith 
C hapter I, ‘The Evidence o f the Descent o f Man 
from  some Lower Form’, and the book on sexual 
selection begins w ith  Chapter VIII, ‘Principles of 
Sexual Selection’. Darwin opens the chapter by 
explaining th a t sexual selection is ‘th a t kind of 
selection’ th a t ‘depends on the  advantage w hich 
certain  individuals have over o ther individuals of 
the same sex and species, in  exclusive relation 
to  reproduction’ (page 256). Sexual selection is 
about relative advantage in  the com petition for 
m ates, no t about survival or absolute com petence 
to reproduce.
When the two sexes follow exactly the same 
habits of life, and the male has more highly 
developed sense or locomotive organs than the 
female, it may be that these in their perfected 
state are indispensable to the male for finding 
the female; but in the vast majority of cases, they 
serve only to give one male an advantage over 
another, for the less well-endowed males, if  time 
were allowed them, would succeed in pairing 
with the females; and they would in all other 
respects, judging from the structure of the 
female, be equally well adapted for their 
ordinary habits of life.
. -r. - (page 257)
Darwin th en  describes several kinds of sex differ­
ences th a t seem to m ake sense on this principle; 
for example, the  generally earlier em ergence of 
m ale insects. He notes th a t the in tensity  o f the 
com petition for m ates will be a function  o f the 
sex ratio  and then  opens a section titled  ‘Num er­
ical Proportion o f the  Two Sexes’ (page 263).
I have remarked that sexual selection would be a 
simple affair if  the males considerably exceeded
in number the females. Hence I was led to . 
investigate, as far as I could, the proportions 
between the two sexes of as many animals as 
possible; but the materials are scanty. I will here 
give only a brief abstract of the results, retaining 
the details for a supplementary discussion, so as 
not to interfere with the course of my argument. 
Domesticated animals alone afford the 
opportunity of ascertaining the proportional 
numbers at birth; but no records have been 
specially kept for this purpose. By indirect 
means, however, I have collected a considerable 
body of statistical data, from which it appears 
that with most of our domestic animals the sexes 
are nearly equal at birth. ,
Darw in’s num bers show rough equality or m od­
est m ale excesses a t b irth  for various domes­
tic species and for hum ans. He th en  points out 
th a t ‘we are concerned w ith  the  proportion of 
the  sexes, no t a t b irth , bu t a t m aturity,’ because 
th a t is w hen the  com petition for m ates will oc­
cur. His data here are less definite, b u t they 
suggest greater m ale m ortality  and thus a rel­
ative deficit o f males a t m aturity. However, ‘The 
practice o f polygamy leads to  the  same results 
a s . . .  an  actual ineq u a lity . . .  for if  each m ale se­
cures two or m ore females, m any males will 
no t be able to  pair; and the la tte r assuredly 
will be the weaker or less attractive individuals.’ 
Pages 266-279 th en  review patterns o f polygamy 
and sexual dim orphism , and pages 279-300 dis­
cuss the  ‘laws o f inheritance’ o f secondaiy sexual 
characters.
The chapter then  re tu rns to the problem  of 
the sex ratio. Pages 300-315 present a detailed 
‘Supplem ent on the proportional num bers o f the 
two sexes in  anim als belonging to  various classes’ 
(hum ans, horses, sheep, birds, fish and insects). A 
final short section ‘On the  Power o f N atural Se­
lection to regulate the proportional Numbers of 
the Sexes, and General Fertility’ (pages 315-320) 
lays ou t the evolutionaiy argum ent. Its second 
paragraph (page 316) begins as follows:
Let us now take the case of a species producing 
. . .  an excess of one sex-we will say of males- 
these being superfluous and useless, or nearly 
useless. Could the sexes be equalized through 
natural selection? We may feel sure, from all 
characters being variable, that certain pairs
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would produce a somewhat less excess of males 
over females than other pairs. The former, 
supposing the actual number of the offspring to 
remain constant, would necessarily produce more 
females, and would therefore be more productive. 
On the doctrine of chances a greater number of 
the offspring o f the more productive pairs would 
survive; and these would inherit a tendency to 
procreate fewer males and more females. Thus a 
tendency towards the equalization of the sexes
would be brought about__ The same train of
reasoning is applicable. . .  if  we assume that 
females instead of males are produced in excess, 
for such females from not uniting with males 
would be superfluous and useless.
Parents th a t produce an  excess of the m inority  
sex w ill be ‘m ore productive’ because fewer of 
the ir offspring will be ‘superfluous’. The para­
graph says m ore o f these offspring will ‘sur­
vive’, b u t this is illogical. Perhaps Darwin m eant 
‘reproduce’, or perhaps he was confused about 
the cause o f the differential productivity. The 
paragraph asserts th a t parents of the  m inority  
sex will enjoy a productivity advantage, no m at­
te r w hich sex is ‘produced in  excess’, and it  indi­
cates th a t the sex in  excess will suffer increased 
failure to  m ate (‘no t un itin g ’). But does the para­
graph show how these effects m odulate parental 
fitness? It certainly contains all the  elem ents and 
reaches the righ t conclusion, bu t it does no t 
clearly explain why, or in  w hat sense, parents of 
the m inority  sex are ‘m ore productive’. In retro­
spect it  comes extrem ely close (see Sober 1984, 
Bulmer 1994, Edwards 1998), bu t it  does no t ex­
plain w hat will happen  in  the  generation of the 
paren ts’ grandprogeny.
The next paragraph (pp. 317-318) presents 
both  an  advance and a retreat. The advance is 
an  overt anticipation o f the  concept o f parental 
expenditure or investm ent (as ‘force’). In the  pre­
vious paragraph, Darwin had  explicitly noted  the 
trade-off betw een num bers of m ale and num bers 
of fem ale offspring; in  this paragraph he explic­
itly notes the  trade-off betw een offspring num ­
ber and offspring quality. Parents th a t produce 
fewer ‘superfluous m ales’ bu t ‘an  equal num ­
ber o f productive fem ales’ would probably ben­
efit, as a consequence, from  ‘larger and finer’ ova 
or embryos, and ‘th e ir young [would be] b e tter
nu rtu red  in  the wom b and afterwards.’ In sup­
port o f this idea, Darwin notes th a t inverse re­
lationships betw een seed num ber and seed size 
can be seen both  am ong and w ith in  species o f 
plants. ‘Hence the offspring o f the parents w hich 
had wasted least force in  producing superfluous 
males would be the m ost likely to survive, and 
would inherit the  same tendency no t to produce 
superfluous males, w hilst re ta in ing  the ir full fer­
tility  in  the  production o f females. So it  would 
be w ith  the converse case o f [an excess of] the 
female sex.’
The re trea t is a m uddled explanation o f the 
disadvantages experienced by ‘superfluous’ off­
spring. For purposes o f argum ent, Darwin had be­
gun  the paragraph assum ing th a t there was an 
excess o f males, and th a t some parents produced 
fewer o f them  bu t a typical num ber o f females. 
‘W hen the offspring from  the m ore and the less 
male-productive parents were all m ingled to­
gether, none w ould have any direct advantage 
over the others.’ This is no t tru e  in  the sense th a t 
he seems to  in tend. The offspring m ight be equi­
valent individually (leaving aside the  ‘ind irec t’ 
benefits noted above), b u t no t collectively; par­
ents th a t produced m ore m ales would have m ore 
descendants through males th an  those th a t pro­
duced fewer males, given th a t the  offspring ‘were 
all m ingled together’. In this sense sons are 
no t ‘superfluous’ even w hen produced in  excess. 
Darwin seems to  be im agining th a t parents th a t 
contribute to  the  m ale excess will have no m ore 
grandoffspring th rough  th e ir sons (collectively) 
th an  those parents th a t refrain  from  producing 
excess males.
In the  second edition  o f the Descent (1874), 
m ost of Chapter VIII is sim ilar to  th a t o f the first 
edition, bu t the final section is com pletely differ­
ent. It is renam ed ‘The proportion o f the sexes 
in  relation  to n a tu ra l selection’, and it  consists 
m ainly o f an inconclusive discussion o f the  rela­
tionship betw een sex-biased infanticide and  the 
prim ary sex ratio. It concludes: ,
In no case, as far as we can see, would an 
inherited tendency to produce both sexes in 
equal numbers or to produce one sex in excess, 
be a direct advantage or disadvantage to certain 
individuals more than to others: for instance, an 
individual with a tendency to produce more
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males than females would not succeed better in 
the battle for life than an individual with an 
opposite tendency; and therefore a tendency of 
this kind could not be gained through natural
selection__ I formerly thought that when a
tendency to produce the two sexes in equal 
numbers was advantageous to the species, it 
would follow from natural selection, but I now 
see that the whole problem is so intricate that it 
is safer to leave its solution for the future.
W hy did Darwin abandon his own previous argu­
m en t w hich was close to the ‘solu tion’ and clearly 
moving in  the righ t direction? On one reading 
o f  the  1874 retraction, he considers the 1871 ar­
gum ent to  be flawed by a reliance on species- 
benefit reasoning. Consistent w ith  such an  in ­
terpreta tion , the paragraph laying ou t the evo­
lu tionary  argum ent (1871, p 316) includes an  ex­
traneous and confused aside on the ad justm ent 
o f fertility, w hich we deleted from  our earlier 
quotation. ,
. . .  But our supposed species would by this process 
be rendered, as just remarked, more productive; 
and this would in many cases be far from an 
advantage; for whenever the limit to the numbers 
which exist, depends, not on destruction by 
enemies, but on the amount o f food, increased fer­
tility will lead to severer competition and to most 
of the survivors being badly fed. In this case, if  the 
sexes were equalized by an increase in the number 
of the females, a simultaneous decrease in the 
total number of the offspring would be beneficial, 
or even necessary, for the existence of the species; 
and this, I believe, could be effected through 
natural selection in the manner hereafter to be 
described.
W hy Darwin should invoke, here, the concept 
o f species’ benefit (or need!) seems baffling. Two 
pages later, as prom ised, he describes in  two 
paragraphs how reduced fertility  (offspring num ­
ber) could evolve by ordinary n a tu ra l selection, 
given trade-offs betw een m aintenance and repro­
duction, and betw een offspring num ber and 
quality. These two paragraphs end the  chapter 
and brilliantly  anticipate late-tw entieth-century 
developm ents in  life-history theory. They contain 
no species-benefit reasoning th a t we can detect. 
Darwin credits H erbert Spencer’s Principles of Biol­
ogy (1867) for inspiration on this subject.
It seems odd th a t Darwin should have lost 
his nerve and  failed to correct confusions th a t 
were probably no worse th an  hundreds th a t 
he m ust have surm ounted  in  o ther contexts. 
His decision to remove the en tire argum ent 
from  the second edition  o f the  Descent (1874) 
can be taken to  support the  view th a t he never 
really understood the  principle as well as a 
generous reading m igh t suggest he did a t the 
tim e he w rote it. He sees a close connection 
betw een sexual selection and the  sex ratio: as the 
num ber o f males com peting for each productive 
m ating  increases, th e ir average reproductive 
success m ust decrease. But he does no t seem to 
recognize th a t he should directly com pare the 
average fitnesses o f males and females, and th a t 
he should evaluate the fitnesses o f parents by 
counting the ir grandprogeny. In any case, his 
decision to remove the evolutionary argum ent 
from  the second edition undoubtedly changed 
the history o f behavioural ecology. The second 
edition was reprin ted  far m ore extensively th an  
the first and becam e the  edition  read by alm ost 
everyone, including RA Fisher (Edwards 1998).
The recognition th a t sex ratios evolve th rough 
negatively frequency-dependent selection on the 
relative reproductive success of m ale and  female 
offspring is traditionally  a ttribu ted  to Fisher 
(1930). His two-page verbal argum ent is inform ed 
by a knowledge o f genes and it is far m ore lu ­
cid th an  Darw in’s, b u t otherw ise it  is very sim ­
ilar in  spirit. W hy does Fisher no t credit Dar­
win? One explanation is tha t, like m ost o f his 
contem poraries, Fisher had  read the second edi­
tion  o f the  Descent and understandably failed to 
see any reason to  persue Darwin’s h in t about 
w hat he ‘form erly th o u g h t’. Edwards (1998) has 
shown th a t Darwin’s in itia l lead was picked 
up by Diising and several early tw entie th  cen­
tu ry  authors w ho fu rth er clarified the argum ent, 
and th a t Fisher was alm ost certainly aware of 
a t least some o f these la ter works. W hy does 
Fisher no t cite them  either? Edwards suggests 
th a t Fisher understood his own account o f  the 
principle to  be derived from  these sources, th a t 
he assum ed his in terested  contem poraries also 
w ould have been aware o f  them , and th a t stan­
dards o f scholarly a ttribu tion  were no t as strict 
in  1930 as they are today. These factors could
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explain why Fisher (1930) presents the  principle 
so casually.
1.5 The elements of a sex ratio 
model
A fully specified m odel o f evolutionary adapta­
tion  can be viewed as a proposal showing how 
certain  biological circum stances will give rise 
to  a fitness function and a set o f constraints. These 
relations are typically referred to as the assump­
tions, because the m odeller is free, in  principle, 
to  change them  in  arbitrary  ways. Models based 
on relatively ‘realistic’ assum ptions are often 
considered m ore scientifically ‘in teresting’ than  
those based on unrealistic assum ptions, but, as 
Fisher h im self points ou t in  the  preface to  The 
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930), models 
cannot really illum inate the n a tu ra l world 
w ithou t also illum inating  u n n a tu ra l worlds. ‘No 
practical biologist in terested  in  sexual repro­
duction would be led to  w ork ou t the  detailed 
consequences experienced by organism s having 
three or m ore sexes; yet w hat else should he do 
if  he wishes to  understand  w hy the  sexes are, 
in  fact, always two?’ A m odel becomes explicitly 
m athem atical w hen  it  embodies its assum ptions 
(‘th ree  sexes’, for example) in  a set of form al 
quantitative relations th a t can be evaluated to 
reveal expected evolutionary outcom es. These 
deductions, following from  the assum ptions, can 
be in terp reted  as predictions about w hat would 
be expected to  happen  if  the  world actually 
worked as the assum ptions propose it  does. Such 
a derivation o f  expected consequences o f the 
assum ptions is often referred to as an  analysis of 
the  model.
There are two distinctive bu t com plem en­
tary approaches to  setting  up  and analysing 
explicit sex ra tio  models. The older, m ore in­
tuitive and  m ore expressive approach employs 
‘expected-future-fitness’ calculations sim ilar in  
spirit to  those used in  m any inclusive-fitness and 
quantitative-genetic models. In this approach, 
sex-allocation strategies are evaluated w ith  re­
spect to  the expected fu tu re  frequencies o f se­
lectively neu tra l genes (tracers o f descent) car­
ried by an  individual paren t th a t exhibits a given 
sex ra tio  phenotype. The younger, m ore rigorous 
b u t less transparen t approach employs dynam i­
cal population-genetic models to  ask under w hat 
circum stances an  allele th a t determ ines a spe­
cific paren tal sex ratio  phenotype can invade (or 
fix) against an  allele th a t determ ines a different 
phenotype. Both kinds of models can vary widely 
in  sophistication and  complexity. N either is in­
herently  ‘b e tte r’; the choice o f approach is largely 
a m atter o f taste and the natu re  o f the problem  
being considered (see Bulmer 1994). We will illus­
tra te  bo th  approaches.
Even in  its original verbal form , the D arw in- 
Fisher argum ent is a legitim ate (if primitive) sex 
ratio  model. It is only m arginally m athem atical, 
bu t th a t does no t disqualify it as a m odel. The 
relevant assum ptions are clearly identified, 
m ost im portantly: (1 ) th a t sex-specific fitness 
differences arise from  an  inevitable ‘com peti­
tio n ’ for mates, w hich implies a fitness function, 
and  (2) th a t parents th a t produce m ore sons 
(or daughters) m ust necessarily produce fewer 
daughters (or sons), w hich implies a constraint. 
The im plicitly quantitative analysis proceeds as 
follows. Parents th a t overproduce the m inority  
sex will have offspring th a t enjoy greater than  
average reproductive success, on average. There­
fore, any heritable variants th a t tend  to cause 
overproduction o f the m inority  sex will increase 
in  frequency, and as they do so the sex ratio 
im balance w ill decrease. Because this is tru e  no 
m atte r w hich sex is currently  under-represented, 
there m ust be a stable evolutionary equilibrium  
a t which m ale and female offspring are produced 
in  approxim ately equal num bers. If all parents 
w ere to produce equal num bers o f females and 
males, then  no other sex ratio  phenotype could 
increase under selection. Today we would call 
this unbeatable phenotype an  ‘evolutionarily sta­
ble strategy’ or ESS (Maynard Smith & Price 1973).
1.6 I Dusing’s model
The first general m athem atical trea tm en t of 
sex ra tio  evolution has long been a ttribu ted  to 
Shaw and Mohler (1953), who derived an  elegant 
form alization o f Fisher’s argum ent. However,
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Edwards (1998), in  reconstructing Fisher’s sour­
ces, discovered th a t a sim ilar m athem atical trea t­
m en t had been published alm ost 70 years earlier 
by Karl Dtising. His Ph.D. dissertation (Diising 
1883, expanded to  book length  in  1884) is m ainly 
a study o f factors associated w ith  variation in  
progeny sex ratios in  ‘m an, anim als and p lan ts’ 
(e.g. m aternal age and parity). In the early pages 
o f this work, Diising poses and answers a ques­
tion  th a t leads h im  to construct w hat is undoub t­
edly the  first form al sex ratio  m odel and perhaps 
the first m athem atical m odel in  evolutionary 
biology.
Given th a t anim als vary th e ir sex ratios in  re­
sponse to particu lar conditions o f life, why do 
we n o t see large overall sex ratio  imbalances? The 
reason, Diising says, is th a t deviations from  a bal­
anced sex ratio  will tend  to be self-correcting: an 
excess o f one sex provides a reason to produce 
m ore o f the other. To m ake the argum ent con­
crete, he assumes a population in  w hich there  is 
a lack of females, and  points ou t th a t all the males 
together have the same number of offspring as all the 
females. Because the la tte r are (by assum ption) in  
the  m inority, each will have on average m ore off­
spring. For example, if  there  are x females and 
nx males, and if  they produce z offspring in  all, 
th en  each fem ale will produce z/x offspring and 
each m ale w ill produce zjnx (Diising 1884 p. 10, 
see Edwards 2000 for a full transla tion  o f the 
argum ent). He points ou t th a t i f  a fem ale pro­
duced m ore fem ale offspring, these daughters 
w ould produce, collectively, a larger th an  aver­
age num ber o f offspring. Suppose a fem ale pro­
duces A sons and a daughters, and ano ther pro­
duces the  converse (A daughters and a sons). The 
first w ill have
* 2 2 A —  +  a — 
nx x
grandchildren and  the second w ill have







individuals to  the second generation, while the  
second fem ale w ill contribute
az
x
i  +  „
n
w hich is




tim es as many. Dtising notes th a t i f  the popula­
tion  sex ratio  is balanced (n =  1 ), th en  this ex­
pression evaluates to  1 for any sex ratio. No mat­
ter what progeny sex ratio a female produces, she will 
have the same number of descendants in the second 
generation. But no t so if  the  sex ratio  is unbal­
anced. For example, if  there  are twice as m any 
m ales as females, th en  the ratio  o f grandchildren  
will be





If we assum e th a t A > a, such th a t A = b a  (with 
b > 1 ), th en  the first fem ale w ill contribute
(1.3)
as a function  o f the difference in  progeny sex 
ratios (b). Diising contrasts the  fitnesses o f two 
females for w hich b =  3; the  one producing a 
threefold female excess has 7/5 as m any grand­
children as the  one producing a threefold m ale 
excess.
In less th an  two pages, Dtising both  clarifies 
Darw in’s argum ent and quantifies it. He identi­
fies the  key underlying fact th a t to ta l m ale and 
fem ale fitnesses m ust be equal; he identifies rela­
tive num bers o f grandchildren as the  appropriate 
m easure o f fitness; he writes a general expression 
for fitness as a function  o f the  p a ren t’s progeny 
sex ratio  b given the population sex ratio  n; and 
he discovers th a t fitness is unaffected by progeny 
sex ratios if  and  only if  th e  population  sex ratio  
is balanced (in effect, the  ESS argum ent). Having 
given a general theoretical reason why progeny 
sex ratio  ad justm en t m igh t be advantageous to 
individuals, he then  em barks on a massive em pir­
ical review o f such adjustm ents and th e ir corre­
lates in  m any species. Apparently this subject was 
as in teresting  and controversial in  D using’s tim e 
as it  is today; his analyses o f  th e  patterns were 
m uch discussed, and his evolutionary m odel was 
forgotten (Edwards 1998, 2000, SH Orzack, pers. 
comm.).
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1.7 Fisher’s equal-investment 
principle
Fisher’s (1930) explanation o f  the sex ratio  prin­
ciple is as b rie f as D using’s, b u t purely verbal 
and veiy well known, so we w ill no t dwell on 
i t  here except to  no te  th a t it  presents a very im ­
p o rtan t generalization o f  the  earlier argum ents. 
Fisher carefully considers the  natu re  o f the  con­
s tra in t on m ale and  fem ale offspring production, 
and  discovers th a t the  sex ratio  equilibrium  con­
cerns the  d istribution o f paren tal effort or ‘ex­
pend itu re’ (later generalized by Trivers 1972 as 
‘investm ent’), no t num bers per se. For example, 
suppose daughters are twice as costly to produce 
as sons. Then a paren t w ith  the resources to  pro­
duce 12  sons m ight instead produce six daugh­
ters. W hat is the  evolutionary equilibrium  in  this 
case? At a num erical sex ratio  o f 1:1 a typical 
p aren t could have four sons and four daughters. 
Males and females w ill have equal average repro­
ductive success, so a rare male-specialist paren t 
(with 12  sons) would have m any m ore grand- 
offspring th an  an average p aren t (with eight off­
spring in  all), and  this advantage would increase 
the  proportion  o f male-specialist parents (and 
males) in  fu tu re  generations. Only w hen males 
becam e twice as num erous as females (six sons 
and  three daughters in  a typical brood) would 
parents become evolutionarily indifferent to the 
sexes o f th e ir offspring. Sons would be only h a lf 
as successful as daughters, b u t also only h a lf as 
expensive. Thus, over the  population  as a whole, 
we expect to  find equal expenditure or invest­
m en t in  the  two sexes, no t necessarily equal 
num bers.
This generalization leads im m ediately to 
testable predictions. In species w here one sex is 
m ore costly (to parents) th an  the  other, th a t sex 
should tend  to  be produced in  correspondingly 
sm aller num bers. This prediction has held up 
well in  m any recent studies o f sexually dim or­
phic social and solitary Hym enoptera. Fisher was 
aware th a t hum an  m ales suffer higher m ortal­
ity rates in  ch ildhood th an  do females, rendering 
them  less costly per in fan t born. He argues th a t 
the slight b u t conspicuous m ale excess a t b irth
is plausibly an  ad justm ent to equalize overall in­
vestm ent in  the sexes (at least under patterns of 
m ortality  th a t w ould have existed in  early hum an  
societies). This exam ple illustrates the  logic th a t 
has been used m any tim es since th en  to  connect 
sex allocation w ith  o ther aspects o f biology.
1.8 Genetic models I: tracer 
genes and the Shaw-Mohler 
equation
Shaw and M ohler (1953) set ou t to  form alize 
Fisher’s argum ent and connect it  m ore closely 
to  genetics. Their model is extrem ely simple and 
transparen t, and it  form s the basis o f m ost sub­
sequent sex ratio  models. The key idea is to 
calculate the contribu tion  th a t a paren t in  one 
generation (P) makes to  the  gene pool in  the  sec­
ond descending generation  (that o f  its offspring’s 
offspring, G2), if  the p aren t produces a sex ratio  
x (proportion males) in  the  Gj (offspring) gener­
ation  w here the average sex ratio  is X. The fo­
cal paren t produces n offspring in  all, and  the 
population a t large produces N. In Gj there  will 
be NX males and ‘all together they w ill supply 
h a lf the  genes w hich are transm itted  from  Gi 
to  G2’, s o  each m ale’s share w ill be 1/2NX. The 
focal p aren t’s sons therefore contribute nxj2NX 
o f the  genes in  G2, and its daughters contribute 





The p aren t contributes h a lf  o f  the genes carried 
by each o f its nx sons and n( 1 — x) daughters in  
Gi, so its n e t genetic contribution  to  G2 is





n(l — x) 
N(1 — X)_
or
c = 1 f - + Z V4 \M  F )
(1 .8)
(1.9)
‘w here m  and f  are the num bers o f m ale and fe­
m ale zygotes in  the [focal] progeny while M and 
F stand for the corresponding num bers in  the  en­
tire  G i’. C is a m easure o f genetic fitness because 
it  can be in terp reted  as the  expected frequency in
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fu tu re  generations o f a selectively n eu tra l tracer 
allele th a t in  generation P was carried only by 
the  focal parent. If the population sex ratio  is 
balanced (X =  1/2), th en  C =  n/2N  independent 
o f the  focal p a ren t’s sex ratio  (as long as n does 
no t depend on x). But if  X is any o ther value, 
th en  some sex ratios x w ill give rise to  larger 
contributions th an  others. ‘The gene or genes fa­
vored are always those whose increase w ill shift 
the population  sex ra tio  (X) toward O.5.’
The paper goes on to  show th a t the equilib­
rium  progeny sex ratio  is no t affected if  m ale and 
fem ale offspring, once produced, survive to adu lt­
hood w ith  different probabilities; these proba­
bilities cancel ou t o f the expressions for m /M  
and f / F .  Curiously, the paper does not extend 
the  analysis to include sexually dim orphic m or­
tality  rates during the  period o f paren tal care, 
or o ther sources o f differential offspring costs, 
even though Fisher considered this extension ver­
bally and  noted the  im plication th a t m, M, f  
and  F can be in terpreted  m ore generally as net 
paren ta l expenditures on behalf of m ale and fe­
m ale offspring. Bodmer and  Edwards (1960) m od­
elled Fisher’s argum ent by w riting  an expression 
for the  reproductive value produced by a u n it of 
paren ta l expenditure, given sex-specific intrinsic 
costs and probabilities o f surviving the  period of 
paren ta l care. This rate of return m easures ‘the  se­
lective advantage attached to  reproduction w ith  
particu lar sex and paren tal expenditure ra tios’; 
i t  is independent o f the focal p a ren t’s progeny 
sex ratio  w hen ‘the to tal paren tal expenditure in­
, curred in  respect o f children of each sex is equal’, 
confirm ing ‘Fisher’s Law’.
Because the total (population-wide) m ale and 
fem ale investm ents M and  F are directly propor­
tional to the average (individual) investm ents, we 
are free to norm alize the Shaw-M ohler equation 
to  give an  average fitness o f 1 , in  keeping w ith 
m odern conventions in  o ther areas o f population 
genetics
w = 1- ( l + ^
2 \  F M
(1 .10 )
w here F is the average value o f /  in  the popu­
lation  and M is the average value of m. A simple 
analysis th a t explicitly incorporates differential 
costs can then  be carried ou t as follows. The con­
stra in t on allowable com binations o f fem ale and
m ale offspring can be represented by an  equa­
tion  th a t specifies the  num ber o f daughters th a t 
a paren t will produce if  it  also produces m sons. 
For example, assum e the sim plest land  o f linear 
trade-off betw een m ale and fem ale production, 
and le t each daughter cost c tim es as m uch as a 
son. Then the constrain t is cf +  m =  r , or
/
r  — m
(1.11)
w here r  is the  to tal resource available for 
offspring production  (in un its o f the  cost o f a 
son). Substituting the constrain t (eq. 1.11) in to  
the  fitness function  (eq. 1 .10) we get
1 mW =  -  I —-----1----
w 2 \ M
(1.12)
Note th a t the relative cost o f a female (c) cancels 
out, and th a t w ithou t any loss of generality we 
are free to  set the  average resource (R) equal 
to 1. Thus the constrained fitness function  sim­
plifies to
T. T 1 / r  -  m m \  , ,
W =  — ( --------+  — . 1.13
2 \ 1  - m  M )
W hat sex ratio  (m) w ill m axim ize our p a ren t’s 
fitness, given th a t it  has r  un its o f resource? 
Of course we already know w hat the answ er is 
supposed to be: parents should expend equal 
am ounts o f resource on each sex. If th a t’s w hat 
typical parents are doing, th en  M =  V2. and the 
fitness function  fu rth er simplifies to
W  =[(r — m) +  (m)] =  r. (1-14)
Now the  p aren t’s sex allocation (m) also cancels 
out, and its fitness is simply equal to  its resource 
pool. We have explicitly derived the  resu lt th a t 
each paren t is indifferent to  the sexes o f its own 
offspring, even w here m ale and fem ale costs 
differ, as long as there  is equal overall investment 
in  the population  a t large (M =  V2)•
Of course parents are far from  indifferent 
w hen overall investm ent is no t equal, and the 
Shaw-M ohler equation  quantifies the  fitness 
differences associated w ith  atypical (‘m u ta n t’) 
progeny sex ratios in  populations th a t are away 
from  the evolutionaiy equilibrium  (Figure 1.1). 
Not only do parents th a t invest equally in  sons 
and daughters do better th an  average w hen m ost 
o ther parents are investing unequally, bu t par­
ents th a t over-compensate do even better, and
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those th a t produce the under-represented sex ex­
clusively do best o f all. As we m entioned ear­
lier, the  selection coefficients associated w ith  sex 
ratio  differences can be huge relative to  those 
believed to  account for m uch real adaptive evo­
lution, and they can be large relative to those 
needed theoretically to  overpower drift even in 
very sm all populations. For example, consider a 
population ou t o f equilibrium  by only 1% (M =
0.49). Then a paren t w ith  one u n it o f resource 
w ill have a fitness of
1 / l  — m m \
W  =  -  ---------- + --------- . (1.15)
2 V 0.51 0.49 J
A typical paren t (m =  0.49) has a fitness of 
1.0, w hile a nearly identical ‘Fisherian’ paren t 
(m =  0.5) has a fitness o f  1.0004 (0.04% above 
average) and a fully overcom pensating paren t 
(m = 1) has W =  1.02 (2% above average). The 
Fisherian (m =  V2) p a ren t’s advantage increases 
rapidly w ith  the size o f the  population’s deviation 
from  equilibrium , reaching 1 % w hen the devia­
tion  reaches 5% (M =  0.45 or M =  0.55).
In deriving this m odel we m ade some sim­
plifying assum ptions th a t do no t always hold
true. For example, we assum ed th a t the popula­
tion  is effectively infinite and random ly m ating, 
th a t generations are discrete and nonoverlap­
ping, th a t the  constrain t on m ale and fem ale off­
spring num bers is linear (cf + m  =  r) and th a t the 
fitnesses o f individual fem ale and m ale offspring 
are independent o f brood sex ratios. W ith respect 
both  to the ir production  and to  th e ir reproduc­
tive values, positively and negatively synergistic 
in teractions betw een sons and daughters can be 
im agined and, for certain  taxa, docum ented. The 
Shaw-M ohler fram ew ork can be extended to  al­
low for such nonlinearities, and two classic exam­
ples (local m ate  com petition and  herm aphroditic  . 
plants) are considered in  section 1.10. The fitness 
function can be expanded to  account for differ­
ences in  ploidy (e.g. haplodiploidy), to  account 
for differences in  the  focal paren t’s (or o ther care­
giver’s) relatedness to m ale and  fem ale offspring 
(e.g. workers in  social Hymenoptera), to  account 
for differences in  situation-specific m ale and fe­
m ale fitnesses (e.g. offspring o f high- and  low- 
ranking m others in  some ungulate  and prim ate 
species), and to  account for overlapping genera­
tions (see Chapter 2).
A lthough straightforw ard in  principle, these 
and o ther extensions m ay greatly com plicate the 
analysis of the resulting  model. Since bo th  the 
evolutionary and analytical objectives are to  max­
im ize W(m, f )  subject to  constraints, techniques 
from  optim al control theory and o ther branches 
o f applied m athem atics are som etim es used to 
find the evolutionarily stable allocation strate­
gies (e.g. Macevicz & Oster 1976, Oster & W ilson 
1978). Probabilistic approaches m ay also be nec­
essary, as in  the  sm all-population case w here 
stochastic fluctuations o f the sex ratio  will be 
large and the to tal allocation to  m ales and  fe­
m ales (M, F) w ill no t be effectively independent 
o f the  focal p a ren t’s allocation (m, /) .  Here par­
ents are no t indifferent to  the ir own progeny sex 
ratios even w hen the population  is a t its evo­
lu tionary  equilibrium , as first noted  by Verner 
(1965).
M acArthur (1965) identified an  in teresting  
corollary o f the Shaw-M ohler form ulation  th a t 
holds in  m any bu t no t all models w ith  nonover­
lapping generations: a t equilibrium  the product 
o f the  numbers o f females and  males (N /N m) 
is m axim ized, even w here individuals o f  one
Fitness as a function of brood sex ratio in 
populations with different average sex ratios, as described by 
the Shaw-Mohler equation. W(m) is the parent’s expected 
genetic represention in the generation of its grandprogeny, 
given that it has one unit o f resource (r — I) which it uses to 
produce m male and I — m female offspring in a population 
where the average proportional allocation to males is M  (0.3, 
0.5, or 0.6).
Fig I.I
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sex cost m ore th an  the  o ther (see Maynard 
Sm ith 1978,1982, Charnov 1982, Karlin & Lessard 
1986).
At this po in t it  may be useful to  review 
the  core assum ptions and logic o f th is his­
toric neutral-gene-transm ission m odel th a t still 
strongly influences the  way we conceive and anal­
yse selection on sex ratios. The evolutionary pay­
off associated w ith  a given sex ratio  phenotype 
is assum ed to  be proportional to  the  reproduc­
tion  o f the  p a ren t’s offspring. Shaw and  Mohler 
explicitly invoke the  transm ission o f genes, and 
even refer to  th e ir paper as a discussion of 
the  ‘population genetics o f  autosom al genes af­
fecting the prim ary sex ra tio ’, although no al­
leles or gene frequencies appear anywhere in  
it. (Dtising knew noth ing  o f genes, of course, 
bu t intuitively knew th a t m aternal and pater­
nal contributions would be o f equal evolutionary 
im portance.) Thus the  sex ratio  differences 
am ong parents are assum ed to  be caused at 
least in  p a rt by genetic variants th a t the  par­
ents w ill transm it to  the ir offspring. Then, as 
Darwin alm ost argued, the  offspring o f parents 
th a t over-produce the  under-represented sex will 
have m ore offspring, and the ir offspring w ill (as 
he did argue, b u t th en  doubted) ‘in h erit a ten ­
dency to  procreate fewer’ o f the  over-represented 
sex and m ore o f the under-represented sex, so 
th a t ‘a tendency towards the equalization o f the 
sexes [will] be b rough t about’.
In the  Shaw-M ohler form ulation, this reason­
ing is em bodied in  an  equation  th a t expresses the 
to tal expected reproduction  by offspring o f par­
ents th a t produce different sex ratios in  a popula­
tion  w ith  a given overall sex ratio. This m easure 
o f fitness is explicitly constructed to  reflect the 
transm ission to  d istan t generations o f selectively 
n eu tra l genes carried by the  parents. We find th a t 
overproducing the  m inority  sex (more generally, 
the  under-invested sex) always yields greater th an  
average fitness. We in te rp re t fitness (defined in  
this way) as a m etric indicating  the  expected evo­
lu tionary  fates o f alleles th a t incline the ir bearers 
to  produce different progeny sex ratios; such alle­
les are im plicitly ones o f sm all individual effect, 
possibly occurring a t m any different genetic loci 
scattered th roughou t the  genom e. We conclude 
th a t a population  fixed for a ‘Fisherian’ genotype
(m =  M =  V2) should n o t be subject to  invasion 
by male- or female-biasing alleles a t any loci.
W ith the benefit o f h indsight we may be 
tem pted  to  view this argum ent as air-tight. 
After all, its conclusion is know n to be correct. 
But i t  rests on some assum ptions th a t could 
have proved troublesom e. We glossed over all of 
the gritty  m echanistic details th a t connect the 
phenotypes caused by particu lar alleles to  the 
transm ission o f those same alleles. A m om ent’s 
th ough t is all it  takes to  see th a t male-biasing 
alleles w ill tend  to  accum ulate in  males, while 
female-biasing alleles w ill tend  to  accum ulate in  
females (Shaw 1958, Nur 1974). Thus the  frequen­
cies o f  alleles affecting sex ratios w ill differ be­
tw een the sexes (as discussed in  the next section 
and illustra ted  in  Figure 1.3). M ight this affect 
the evolutionary outcom e in  a species w here 
sex ratios are determ ined by ju s t one paren t 
(say, the  mother)? The answ er is no t obvious, 
so we need also to construct and  analyse dy­
nam ic population-genetic models in  w hich these 
potentially  critical connections are represented 
explicitly.
1.9 Genetic models II: alleles that 
determine parental sex ratios
We were able to develop the  logic o f expected- 
future-fitness models along historical lines, be­
cause the  history begins simply and  th en  adds 
layers o f complexity. By contrast, the  history 
o f models w ith  alleles th a t specifically affect 
paren tal sex ratios is no t so straightforw ard. The 
first models were, for the  m ost part, relatively 
complex, opaque and lacking in  generality, so 
they do no t provide good examples w ith  w hich 
to  in troduce the  subject as presently  understood. 
For this reason we will first describe a m ore 
highly derived b u t sim ple and generic model, and 
th en  look back briefly a t some pioneering models 
from  the  literature.
Genetic evolution will no t occur unless the 
genom e includes a t least one locus w ith  two or 
m ore different genotypes th a t tend  to  produce 
different phenotypes. Often we can reasonably 
assum e th a t w hat’s true  for one locus will be 
tru e  (qualitatively) for others, in  w hich case the
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I f  'Qm
Ppcf) = m
P(99) = 1 -  m 
P(oo) = m
P(99) = 1 -  777* 
Ppd)  = m *
Mating types and offspring productions in a haploid 
genetic model. Alleles a and A occur at frequencies qf and 
I — qf in females and qm and I — qm in males. Male and female 
parents mate at random, so the four mating types occur in the 
proportions indicated above the pedigrees. Diploid zygotes 
form briefly and then undergo meiosis to  form haploid spores 
that develop into the next generation of adults. Brood sex 
ratios are determined by the mother's genotype (m for 
mothers of genotype a, and m* for mothers of genotype A).
problem  can be represented adequately by ju s t 
one locus w ith  two alleles. Often it is also reason­
able to le t the species be haploid, so as to  reduce 
the num ber o f distinct genotypes to an  ab­
solute m inim um . If we assum e, in  addition, 
th a t progeny sex ratios are determ ined by the 
m o ther’s phenotype, and  th a t parents m ate ran­
dom ly w ith  respect to  the ir sex ratio  genotypes, 
th en  we have defined the veiy sim ple m odel th a t 
is shown in Figure 1.2 and sum m arized alge­
braically in  Table 1.1. Each row in  the table repre­
sents one o f the four m ating  types illustrated  in  
the figure. Alleles a  and  A act in  the  m other to de­
term ine h er expected progeny sex ratio, m or m*, 
respectively. The frequency of a  is q j  in  females 
and qm in  males. The entries under ‘daugh ters’ 
and ‘sons’ are the expected proportions o f  each 
progeny resulting  from  m atings of a given type 
(row) th a t w ill be females or m ales o f genotypes 
a or A (columns).
P(99) = 1 - / 7 7 *  
P (00) = m*
The state variables in  this m odel are the  geno­
type frequencies q f  and qm. We w an t to  know 
w hether these gene frequencies w ill change and, 
if  so, in  w hich direction. To do this we need to 
w rite  equations for q'j and q'm (the allele frequen­
cies next generation) as functions o f  q f  and qm 
(the allele frequencies this generation). This may 
sound difficult, b u t in  fact it is easy given the 
prelim inary calculations we have already placed 
in  the table.
By definition, q'f  is the  proportion o f all daugh­
ters th a t will be of genotype a. The total produc­
tion  o f daughters is q /( l  -  m) +  (1 -  q /)(l -  m*). 
This expression goes in  the  denom inator. For the 
num erato r we need the to tal production o f 
daughters of genotype a. This can be read di­
rectly from  the  table, as the  sum  o f the products 
form ed by m ultiplying each term  in  the ‘fre­
quency’ colum n by the  term  in  the ‘daughters/a’ 
colum n o f the same row. Thus the recurrence equa­
tion for the  fem ale genotype frequency is
<lf =
qf qm(l -m ) +  ±qf (1 - q m)(l -m ) +  5(1 - q f)qm(l -m *)
qf ( l - m ) + ( l - q f)(l-m *)
(1.16)
To make the  origin and m eaning o f each term  
as easy to see as possible, we have w ritten  the 
equation  w ithou t any fu rth er algebraic simplifi­
cations. By a sim ilar tra in  o f reasoning, we obtain
Table l.l
1 1 ■ 1 ■ ■ ...-----------
i Frequencies and outputs o f  the  four m ating  types in a haploid m odel
Daughters Sons
Mating Frequency a A a A
a x  a 
a x A 
A x a 
A x  A
QfQm
<7f(l -  Qm)
( i  - q d q m  
(1 - q f)(l - q m)
( 1 —m)
' M 1 -  m) 
' / l O - m * )
'/2(l - m )  
'/2(l - m * )  
( l - m * )
m
'/2m '/2m 
V z m *  ' / 2 nr*  
m *
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Generation
Allele frequency and population sex ratio 
trajectories for the two-allele haploid model. Mothers of 
genotype a produce broods with 20% males (m =  0.2) 
regardless of their mate’s genotype, and mothers of genotype 
A produce 60% males (m* =  0.6). The population illustrated 
in the panels on the left begins from an allele frequency of 
q =  0.99, and the population on the right begins from 
q =0 .01.
the corresponding recurrence equation  for the 
m ale allele frequency
, _  gtgrn(m) +  |q f(l -  qm)(m) +  \ ( \  -  gf )gm(m*) 
qf(m) +  (1 -  qt )(m*) '
(1.17)
Everything on bo th  right-hand sides is known, 
so by evaluating this pair o f equations we ob­
* ta in  the  genotype frequencies for the  next gener­
ation; these can th en  be used to  obtain  the geno­
type frequencies for the generation  after that, 
and  so on for as long as we care to  iterate this 
dynam ical system. Doing so by hand  would be 
tedious, bu t it  is easy by com puter. Figure 1.3 
illustrates two such calculations. Given alleles 
w ith  phenotypic values flanking '/2 (in this case, 
m =  0.2 and m* = 0.6), the system always con­
verges to genotype frequencies th a t give M =  l/ 2 
(in this case, q f  = 0.25). Males have a m uch lower 
frequency o f  the  female-biasing allele a (qm =  0.1
0 20 40 60 80
Generation
a t equilibrium ) because a disproportionate num ­
ber o f the ir m others carry the  male-biasing al­
lele A. Despite this com plication, our conclusion 
from  the  expected-future-fitness approach is sup­
ported, a t least for this genetic system.
Any population-genetic m odel th a t can be 
w ritten  down in  this way (as a set o f recurrence 
equations) can be studied by iteration  in  the 
m anner illustra ted  in  Figure 1.3. For example, 
Shaw (1958) did this for a diploid m odel (with­
ou t the  benefit o f a computer!), and H artl and 
Brown (1970) did so for a haplodiploid model. 
But each set o f param eters and  in itia l conditions 
considered in  this way is ju s t  an  anecdote. Even 
in  the  presen t very simple m odel, there  are in­
finitely m any com binations o f  m and m*. Since 
no t all o f them  can be considered, how  are 
we to be confident o f any general conclusions 
we m ight w an t to  draw  about the  m odel’s be­
haviour th roughou t certain  regions o f its para­
m eter space?
Fortunately, we can often obtain rigorous 
general results by restricting our a tten tion  to 
the  dynamics o f  invasion and  fixation. We consider 
the  system’s behaviour a t the ‘boundary’ o f the  
state space, w here one allele (A) is nearly  fixed 
and the  o ther (a) is vanishingly rare. Here the 
system can be represented as a set o f  linear 
equations far sim pler th an  the full system. In
Fig 1.3
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m atrix  form, the  system can be w ritten  q ' =  Mq 
w here q ' and q are vectors o f the (infinitesimal) 
genotype frequencies (here, q/  and qm) and M is 
a m atrix  of coefficients representing the system ’s 
dynamics in  the im m ediate neighbourhood of 
the boundary. The elem ents of M are partial 
derivatives o f the fall recurrence equations 
evaluated a t q  =  0, w here allele a  is im agined 
to have ju s t entered the  population as a veiy 
rare m igran t or a new m utation . As long as a re­
m ains veiy rare, the linearized system accurately 
represents the  behaviour of the full system. 
Standard techniques o f  linear algebra allow us 
to  determ ine under w hat conditions a small 
‘d isturbance’ of the  equilibrium  (i.e. tiny positive 
allele frequencies) w ill grow. Typically th is is all 
we really care about because we need only show 
th a t an  allele w ith  a certain  value o f m* will 
no t be invaded by any allele w ith  an m different 
from  m*. This is usually a straightforw ard task.
In the present case, as in  many, the  m atrix  M 
takes a simple and illum inating  form. Here we 
w rite it  ou t explicitly, w ith  its associated vectors 
q ' and q, and the resu lt o f the m ultiplication, so 
as to make the m eanings of all the  term s easy to 
grasp.
r l  1 - m 1 -






” 1 1 — m
1 f +
1




. 2 1  -m * qm
(1.18)
Note th a t the phenotypic values (m, m*) o f the 
genotypes (a, A) appear only in  the first colum n 
o f the  m atrix, while no th ing  bu t a simple con­
stan t (V2) appears in  the  second colum n. The co­
efficients in  the first colum n are m ultiplied by q/ ,  
the  frequency of the  m u tan t genotype in  females. 
W hen m is sm aller th an  m*, the upper left-hand 
coefficient is greater th an  one-half and the lower 
left-hand coefficient is less th an  one-half. As a 
consequence, increases in  q j  will tend  to cause 
larger increases o f q'j- th an  o f q'm and the rela­
tively female-biasing m u tan t allele a w ill tend  to 
concentrate itse lf in  females. The opposite hap­
pens w hen m  is larger th an  m*. Males transm it 
the ir genotypes w ithou t bias (passively) to daugh­
ters and sons, because males do no t influence the 
sexes o f the ir offspring.
The vector q  (which is near zero) will tend  
to  grow w hen the largest eigenvalue o f  M is 
greater th an  1 , and it  w ill shrink towards zero 
w hen the eigenvalue is less th an  1. (The eigenval­
ues X are solutions o f the  characteristic equation 
det(M — XI) =  0, w here I is the  identity  matrix.) 
The overall m agnitude o f q  will no t change w hen 
the  largest eigenvalue is exactly 1 , and this will 
obviously be the case a t least whenever m =  m*, 
even i f  m* is far from  its evolutionary equilib­
rium . (When m =  m*, all four elem ents o f M are 
V2 exactly.) The eigenvalue is easy to  calculate, 
b u t it  takes a ra ther messy and unrevealing form  
involving nonintegral powers o f m and m*. How­
ever, since we are really m ost in terested  to  know 
w hat conditions o ther th an  m = m* will give an 
eigenvalue o f 1 , we can greatly simplify the prob­
lem  by setting \  = 1 and expanding the resulting  
characteristic equation det(M — I) =  0 w hich usu­
ally takes an  understandable and revealing form. 
In the present case we get
1  l - i  1 m
-----------------------=  0.
4 1 — m* 4 m*
w hich easily rearranges to  give
1
1 =  -  
2
1 — m m
1 -  m* m*
(1.19)
(1 .20)
This should look fam iliar: it  is the Shaw-M ohler 
equation  w ith  the p a ren t’s fitness (the left-hand 
side) set equal to 1. This equality w ill hold, for 
arbitrary  values o f m, if  and  only if  m* =  V2. con­
sistent w ith our previous analysis.
It m ay seem th a t we have worked through 
a great deal o f ‘in trica te ’ genetics and m athe­
m atics (as Darwin predicted), only to re tu rn  to a 
place veiy close to the one he reached 130 years 
ago w ithou t the  benefit of genes or calculations. 
In fact, the theory has been greatly augm ented 
and  strengthened. We understand  th a t the  equi­
librium  entails equal n e t investm ent in  the  sexes, 
w hich will no t m ean  equal num bers if  female 
offspring cost m ore or less th an  males. We u n ­
derstand the basic principle m uch m ore deeply, 
having seen it  im plem ented in  two different
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genetic frameworks, and this gives us bo th  the 
understand ing  and the  confidence to  construct 
complex and sophisticated tracer-gene models 
(e.g. Frank 1998). In short, we now have tools 
w ith  w hich to  a ttack  a nearly un lim ited  range 
o f problem s th a t could no t be solved securely (or 
in  some cases, a t all) w ithou t form al m ethods 
such as these. The next section considers how 
such m ethods have been used to extend the cen­
tra l principle to situations no t encom passed by 
the original model.
1.10 I Themes and variations
In natu re , the  biological circum stances surround­
ing sex allocation are as variable as the  ecologies 
and life histories o f real organisms. This variation 
motivates a seemingly endless diversity o f sex ra­
tio models. Does this diversity of models under­
m ine the  supposed generality  of sex ratio  theory? 
Not really, because the variations play on ju s t  a 
few underlying them es, if  often in  com binations 
w ith  each other.
1. Differential costs of the sexes. This them e was 
clearly identified by Fisher. It arises from  differ­
ential rates of m ortality  during the period of 
paren tal care, from  differential resource needs 
o f m ale and female offspring (reflected for ex­
am ple in  different sizes a t weaning), and from  
o ther ways in  w hich m ale and female offspring 
m ay differentially affect a p a ren t’s fu tu re  repro­
duction (for example, by com prom ising the par­
en t’s fu tu re  growth, or by exposing the paren t to 
increased risks o f mortality).
2. Condition-dependent benefits and reproductive val­
ues of the sexes. Both the constraints and the ge­
netic payoffs associated w ith  different progeny 
sex ratios may change w ith  a variety of envi­
ronm ental factors including seasonality, resource 
availability, paren tal size (competitive ability, 
fecundity) and  aspects o f local population  struc­
ture. In some social species, for example, m em ­
bers o f  the  less-dispersing sex m ay help the ir par­
ents to  defend a territo ry  or to feed subsequent 
offspring, thereby providing direct reproductive 
benefits th a t partially  offset the  costs o f  the ir 
own production. Alternatively, under certain
circum stances the m em bers of one sex may be 
m ore likely to reproduce or to benefit from  in­
creased paren tal investm ent than  the o ther (as 
first argued by Trivers & W illard 1973). Finally, 
the offspring of one sex m ay be m ore likely to 
com pete w ith  each o ther for the  same m atings, 
in  w hich case they are partially  reproductively 
redundan t from  the  p a ren t’s po in t of view (local 
m ate com petition, section 1.10.1). Some o f these 
effects can be subtle, giving rise to  selection pres­
sures far weaker th an  those associated w ith  the 
population’s m ean allocation ratio.
3. Mode of inheritance and locus of control Genes 
w ith  unusual patterns o f  inheritance, such as 
those on Y chromosomes and m itochondrial 
chromosomes, som etim es have different ESS sex 
ratios th an  do those on autosom es, giving rise 
to evolutionary ‘conflicts’ over the sex ratio 
(Hamilton 1967). In haplodiploid species where 
males transm it th e ir genes only to daughters, 
m ates ‘disagree’ profoundly as to  w hat their 
progeny sex ratio  should be (e.g. Brockm ann & 
Grafen 1989), and in  some social Hymenoptera, 
workers and  queens disagree as to w hat sex ra­
tio the ir colony should produce (section 1 .10 .2). 
In principle, embryonic offspring may disagree 
w ith  the ir parents over w hat sex they themselves 
should become; for example, if  one sex is m ore 
costly and therefore produced in  sm aller num ­
bers, all offspring, given the  choice, would prefer 
to be o f th a t sex.
We now briefly describe three classic 
extensions of the  basic D arw in-Fisher m odel to  
show how  it has been adapted to such special 
circum stances.
1. 10 .1 Local mate competition
The cu rren t ‘Golden Age’ o f sex ra tio  research 
could be said to have begun w ith  W.D. H am ilton’s 
(1967) paper ‘Extraordinary sex ratios’. H am ilton 
reviews Fisher’s argum ent and  th en  relaxes two 
o f Fisher’s im plicit assum ptions. The paper’s first 
section relaxes the assum ption th a t sex alloca­
tion  is controlled by autosom al genes (sex-linked 
m eiotic drive, an  instance o f them e 3, above). The 
second section relaxes the assum ption o f random  
m ating  in  a large population  and considers ‘Local 
m ate com petition’ or LMC (them e 2). H am ilton 
considers species such as fig wasps, w here m ating
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takes place in  sm all aggregations representing 
the offspring o f ju s t  a few females, followed by 
dispersal o f the  m ated females. Under this pop­
ulation  structure, brothers com pete relatively di­
rectly w ith  each o ther for m atings, b u t sisters do 
no t com pete directly for the resources on w hich 
the ir own reproductive success depends. This 
asym m etry requires a modified fitness function.
Under the LMC scenario, a m o ther’s fitness 
rises linearly w ith  the num ber of dispersing fe­
m ales she produces, as in  the  Darwin-Fisher 
m odel, bu t not w ith  the  num ber of sons. Because 
her sons tend  to  com pete w ith  each other, each 
additional son yields a smaller increase in  the total 
number of inseminations achieved by all h er sons to­
gether, w hich is the o ther source of her fitness. 
In o ther words, m ale production  obeys a law of 
dim inishing reproductive retu rns th a t does no t 
apply to  daughters. H am ilton w rites expected- 
future-fitness expressions for females producing 
sex ratios xA and xg in  a population w here each 
m ating  aggregation contains the offspring o f n 
random ly chosen females, and he finds th a t the 
‘unbeatable’ (ESS) sex ratio  is
n — 1 
2n '
(1 .21 )
netic m odel and  iterates it on the  com puter for 
the case n =  2. Surprisingly, the  unbeatable sex 
ratio  tu rns ou t to be approxim ately 0.21 ra ther 
th an  0.25 as predicted by the general analytical 
model. This discrepancy was la ter confirm ed to 
be a real difference betw een the ESSs for diploid 
(biparental) and  haplodiploid (arrhenotokous) ge­
netic systems, th rough the analysis o f m ore so­
phisticated expected-future-fitness models and 
explicit genetic models (Hamilton 1979, Taylor 
& Bulmer 1980, Uyenoyama & Bengtsson 1982, 
Frank 1985, Herre 1985, Taylor 1988, Stubblefield 
& Seger 1990). The exact ESS for haplodiplody is
m
(n -  l)(2n -  1 ) 
n(4n — 1) '
(1.22)
In an  aggregation containing the offspring of 
two unrelated  m others, the ESS allocation is 
extrem ely unequal: 25% effort to sons, 75% to 
daughters. However, as n increases beyond ju s t 
a few m others contributing offspring to  each ag­
gregation, brothers com pete less directly w ith 
each o ther (so they are less redundan t from  their 
m o ther’s po in t o f view), and the  optim al m ale 
investm ent rises tow ard 50%. In an  aggregation 
founded by ju s t  one female, the theoretical opti­
m um  sex ratio is 0% males, w hich is in terpreted  
as ‘[no] m ore m ales th an  are necessary to ensure 
the  fertilization o f all h er daughters’. H am ilton 
reviews sex ratio  data from  wasps, beetles, mites 
and th rips th a t m ate in  sm all aggregations and 
th a t have haplodiploid genetic systems perm it­
ting  females to freely control th e ir progeny sex 
ratios. Broods are strongly female-biased in  al­
m ost every case b u t tend  to include a t least one 
male.
To test the m odel’s logic, H am ilton con­
structs an  explicit dynam ical haplodiploid ge­
The downward deviation of m* (for a given n), 
relative to H am ilton’s original solution, is a con­
sequence of arrhenotoky (males developing from  
unfertilized eggs), no t haplodiploidy per se. The 
same ESS (eq. 1.22) holds for hypothetical haplo- 
haploid and diplodiploid genetic systems un ­
der which, as in  ordinary haplodiploidy, females 
arise from  biparentally  produced zygotes while 
males arise from  unfertilized eggs (Stubblefield 
& Seger 1990). Under arrhenotoky, bu t no t u n ­
der b iparental genetic systems (regardless o f the 
ploidys o f males and females), inbreeding has 
unequal effects on genetic transm ission th rough 
the two sexes, and this leads to  the  difference 
betw een eqs. 1.21 and  1 .22.
Under the  assum ptions o f the  original 
Darwin-Fisher m odel, equal investm ent in  the 
sexes is a ‘weak-form’ ESS, no t an  optim um : i f  the 
population as a w hole invests equally, th en  all in­
dividual allocations (from 100% sons th rough  to 
100% daughters) are equally fit. But under LMC, 
the ESS is ‘strong-form’ (Uyenoyama & Bengts­
son 1982): even if  the population  is a t equilib­
rium , individuals suffer reduced fitness if  the ir 
own progeny sex allocations depart from  the  ESS, 
because fitness is determ ined by the sex ratios 
w ith in  local aggregations.
During the  last two decades of the  tw entie th  
century, local m ate com petition becam e a cen­
trepiece o f sex ratio  research both  th rough ex­
perim ental studies o f several species o f  parasitoid 
wasps and th rough  field studies o f en tire com m u­
nities o f  fig wasps (Chapters 6 ,1 0 ,1 9  and 20). An
18 I JON SEG ER & J. WILLIAM STUBBLEFIELD
im portan t theoretical and em pirical issue ru n ­
n ing  through m uch o f this w ork concerns sex 
ra tio  adjustm ents m ade by individual m others 
in  response to inform ation about the  num bers 
and  fecundities of o ther females likely to  have 
contributed offspring to the same m ating  aggre­
gation. W hat cues m ight females use to  gather 
inform ation about o ther females contributing to 
th e ir  aggregation? W hat responses should they 
try  to make? How accurate m ight the ir responses 
be? Both theoretically and empirically, the  an­
swers depend in  in teresting  ways on a variety 
o f  biological details. Given his in terest in  sex ra­
tio  variation am ong families, Karl Dusing clearly 
w ould have enjoyed the cu rren t state o f LMC 
research. —
1. 10.2 Sex ratio conflict in ants
The theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964) 
was conceived w ith  social insects in  m ind, and 
in  his 1972 paper H am ilton considers them  a t 
length. Focusing on the Hym enoptera, he points 
ou t th a t haplodiploidy gives rise to  a peculiar pat­
te rn  o f  relatedness am ong family members. Ow­
ing to the ir fa ther’s haploidy, outbred full sisters 
are related by r  =  3/4, bu t a m other is related to 
offspring o f bo th  sexes by the  usual r  =  V2. (Co­
efficients o f relatedness are reviewed by Bulmer
1994.) Thus a female would transm it m ore of her 
genes to  fu tu re  generations by rearing a sister 
th a n  by rearing a daughter. H am ilton proposes 
th a t as a consequence, a hym enopteran female 
will ‘easily [evolve] an  inclination to w ork in  the 
m aternal nest ra th e r th an  start her own.’ How­
ever, a fem ale is related to  her brothers by only 
h a lf  the  usual am ount (r =  '/4), so she is not m ore 
related to  her m o ther’s offspring os a whole than  
to  h er own, unless ‘the  sex ratio  or some abil­
ity  to  discrim inate allows the  worker to work 
m ainly in  rearing sisters.’ H am ilton suggests th a t 
inbreeding m ight lead to  female-biased sex ra­
tios and thereby to  eusociality, bu t a fem ale’s 
average r  to  her siblings rem ains the same as 
her average r  to  offspring under inbreeding, if  
m others control th e ir own sex ratios (Trivers & 
Hare 1976), so inbreeding does no t o f itself favour 
the  evolution o f eusocial workers. Trivers and 
Hare (1976) argue th a t H am ilton’s suggestion will 
w ork only i f  daughters actively prom ote the ir
own reproductive interests a t the  expense o f  the ir 
m o ther’s.
The asymmetrical degrees of relatedness in 
haplodiploid species predispose daughters to the 
evolution of eusocial behavior, provided that they 
are able to capitalize on the asymmetries, either 
by producing more females than the queen 
would prefer, or by gaining partial or complete 
control of the genetics of male production.
(p. 250)
Trivers and Hare then  outline several different 
steps th a t workers could take to  ‘capitalize’ on 
the ir closer relationships to  sisters, sons and 
nephews th an  to daughters and brothers. The 
m ost im portan t for our purposes (and the m ost 
famous) is ‘Skewing the colony’s investm ent to­
w ard reproductive females and away from  males.’ 
In a colony w ith  ju s t one queen w ho is singly 
m ated, and who lays all the  reproductive eggs, 
females will be th ree tim es as related  to their 
sisters as to  the ir brothers (3 If the  ratio 
of investm ent were 1:1  over the  population  as 
a whole, then  workers would gain th ree tim es as 
m uch fitness from  rearing sisters as from  rearing 
brothers and  m ight therefore benefit from  bias­
ing th e ir investm ent towards sisters, as pointed 
ou t by Hamilton. Trivers and  Hare argue: (1) th a t 
there is little  to stop the workers from  doing this, 
counter to  th e ir m o ther’s interests, since they do 
all the work, and (2) th a t a t the  resulting evolu­
tionary equilibrium
we expect three times as much to be invested in 
females as in males, for at this ratio of 
investment [3:1] the expected [reproductive 
success] of a male is three times that of a female, 
per unit investment, exactly canceling out the 
workers’ greater relatedness to their sisters. Were 
the mother to control the ratio of investment, it 
would equilibrate at 1:1, so that in eusocial 
species in which all reproductives are produced 
by the queen but reared by their sisters, strong 
mother-daughter conflict is expected regarding 
the ratio of investment, and a measurement of 
the ratio of investment is a measure o f the 
relative power of the two parties.
The paper presents an  extensive analysis o f data 
on investm ent ratios in  ants, bees and  wasps w ith  
different kinds o f social structures, and these are
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broadly in  agreem ent w ith  the sex ratio  argu­
m ents. In particular, an  average allocation ratio 
of roughly 3:1 is found for 20 species o f monog- 
ynous ants, in  agreem ent w ith  the m odel on the 
assum ptions: (1 ) th a t the  queens in  m ost o f these 
species are singly m ated, (2) th a t the  relative d iy  
weights o f  males and females indicate th e ir rel­
ative costs to  the  colony, and (3) th a t workers 
tend  to  control the  sex ratio. In 1976 there  was 
very little  evidence about the  m ating  frequencies 
o f queen ants. Subsequent w ork has shown th a t 
m ate num bers can vary w ith in  as well as between 
species, and  has exploited this fact to  produce 
some very clean and elegant tests o f the m odel 
(see below). Subsequent w ork also has shown th a t 
the d iy  weights o f females m ay tend  to  over­
represent th e ir costs relative to  males, such th a t 
the  average allocation ratio  o f  Trivers and Hare’s 
20 m onogynous ants m ay actually be closer to  2:1 
th an  3:1 (see Boomsma 1989, Bourke & Franks
1995, Crozier & Pamilo 1996), as m ight be ex­
pected if  m ultip le m ating  is com m on in  some 
o f these species. Trivers and Hare estim ate allo­
cation ratios for a num ber o f polygynous ants 
(those w ith  several to  m any queens per colony) 
and ‘slave m akers’ (in which the  queen’s offspring 
are reared by workers o f ano ther species); as pre­
dicted, the  apparen t allocation ratios o f  these 
species are less fem ale biased th an  those o f the  
monogynous species, on average.
Having in troduced the  concept o f an  irre­
ducible conflict over the  sex ratio, Trivers and 
Hare go on to  dissect i t  in  some detail. For ex­
ample, if  the  queen lays only a fraction (p) o f 
the m ale eggs, w ith  unm ated  workers laying the 
rem ainder (1 -  p), th en  the equilibrium  ratio  of 
investm ent (F/M) for workers is
3(3 +  p) 
(3 -  p f '
(1.23)
This declines from  3:1 w hen the  queen lays all 
the  m ale eggs (p =  1 ) to  1:1  w hen workers lay 
all the  m ale eggs (p =  0). From the queen’s po in t 
o f view, the corresponding ESS is
(3 +  P)
( 3 - p ) ( l  +  p )’
(1.24)
w hich is 1 :1  a t bo th  endpoints and slightly lower 
in  the  m iddle. The conflict over the sex ratio disap­
pears w hen workers produce all the males, b u t it 
is replaced by a conflict over male production, since 
the  queen’s inclusive fitness is reduced by worker 
laying.
Like o ther models in  the paper, this one is 
derived w ith in  an  expected-future-fitness fram e­
w ork th a t takes Fisher’s principle as an  axiom  
and th a t extends it, using H am ilton’s inclusive­
fitness theoiy, to  account for unequal coefficients 
o f  relatedness and indirect parentage. By 1976 
this fram ew ork seemed so obvious and secure 
to  the authors th a t they could presen t expres­
sions such as (1.23) and (1.24) w ithou t derivation 
and  w ith  little  or no com m ent. O ther theorists, 
n o t so readily persuaded by the logic o f Trivers 
and H are’s novel and in tricate  argum ents, soon 
started  testing  these argum ents by analysing 
explicit genetic models (e.g. Oster et a l 1977, 
Benford 1978, Charnov 1978, Oster & Wilson
1978, Craig 1980, Taylor 1981, Pamilo 1982, 
Bulmer 1983). Trivers and Hare’s central conclu­
sions were all upheld, although a num ber o f pre­
viously unsuspected com plications were uncov­
ered by these models; for example, the way in  
w hich workers w ith  different sex-allocation phe­
notypes in terac t behaviourally to determ ine the 
colony’s sex ratio  can affect the  n a tu re  o f the  ESS 
(Charnov 1978, Craig 1980, Pamilo 1982, Bulmer 
1983).
Social insect colonies differ in  m any relevant 
ways am ong and even w ith in  species. For exam­
ple, as m entioned above they may have little  or 
no worker production  o f males; they m ay have 
one or several queens (or no queen); and  the 
queen or queens may m ate w ith  one or several 
males. Models incorporating each o f these con­
tingencies have been analysed. Variation in  the 
queen’s m ate  num ber w ith in  species is especially 
in teresting  because it  affects the  workers’ b u t no t 
the  queen’s equilibrium  sex allocation, w ith  po­
ten tia lly  dram atic effects on the outcom e o f the 
w orker-queen conflict (Boomsma & Grafen 1990, 
1991).
Consider a species w here there  is always 
one queen b u t she m ay have m ated w ith  one 
or two males, and suppose th a t colonies w ith  
once- and twice-mated queens are equally fre­
q uen t and  equally productive. Workers in  the  
once-mated colonies w ould be indifferent to  th e ir
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colony’s allocation ratio  i f  the  population-wide ra­
tio were 3:1, as in  the  sim plest m odel considered 
above. But workers in  the twice-mated colonies 
would be indifferent if  the population ratio  were 
2:1. (Their average relatedness to sisters is r  =  
V2(3/4 +  V4) =  1/ 2-) Thus both  colony types cannot 
be indifferent sim ultaneously. If the population- 
w ide allocation ratio  is m ore female-biased than  
2:1, th en  workers in  twice-mated colonies would 
do best to  produce males (brothers) exclusively, 
because males would be the under-represented 
sex from  the ir po in t o f view. Similarly, i f  the 
population-wide ratio  is less female-biased than  
3:1, th en  workers in  once-mated colonies should 
produce females (sisters) exclusively.
Suppose th a t workers can assess the queen’s 
m ate  num ber (for example, by perceiving the 
genetic diversity of th e ir sisters). Then, given 
our assum ptions th a t the  two colony types are 
about equally frequent and th a t workers can ‘as­
sum e’ a roughly equal m ix ture o f colony types, 
the evolutionarily stable outcom e should be a 
polym orphism  am ong colonies, w ith  the singly 
m ated colonies specializing in  exclusive female 
production  and the twice-mated colonies produc­
ing (at least on average) a 1:2 male bias such th a t 
the  com bined population-wide investm ent ratio 
is 2:1. These divergent allocations by colonies 
w ith  different patterns o f relatedness asymme- 
tiy  give rise to  a ‘split sex ra tio ’ d istribution  over 
colonies. N either type of colony can improve its 
fitness by m aking a different sex ratio, and nei­
th e r actually  produces its own ESS, although in 
our exam ple the population average is the ESS 
for twice-mated colonies.
Colony sex ratios are d istributed bim odally 
in  m any an t species, and some recent genetic 
studies of m ate num bers in  such species are 
qualitatively consistent w ith  the predictions of 
this sp lit sex ratio  model. Colonies w ith  o n c e  
m ated queens tend  to  produce sex ratios th a t 
are m ore strongly female-biased th an  those of 
colonies w ith  twice-mated queens (Sundstrom 
1994, Sundstrom  et al. 1996). These findings sup­
po rt the  idea th a t sex ratio  ‘im balances’ (from 
any actor’s po in t o f view) create significant op­
portunities to increase fitness by m aking adjust­
m ents th a t exploit the  im balance, and they sug­
gest th a t worker ants can in  fact assess levels 
o f  relatedness w ith in  the ir own colonies. O ther
sources of among-colony variation in  related­
ness asymmetry, w ith  expected or observed ef­
fects on among-colony sex ratio  variation, have 
been considered by Trivers and Hare (1976), Ward 
(1983), Yanega (1989), Boomsma (1991), Mueller 
(1991), Chan and Bourke (1994), Evans (1995) and 
others.
1.10.3 Hermaphrodites
Most p lants are sim ultaneous herm aphrodites 
(Chapter 16), as are some anim als. In such 
species, sex allocation is a m atter o f relative ef­
fort devoted to  m ale and fem ale functions (for 
example, to  pollen and seed production). Given 
a linear trade-off betw een m ale and fem ale func­
tions, the ESS in an  outbreeding population is to 
invest equally in  each kind o f function (Maynard 
Smith 1971). Empirically, relative investm ent in 
m ale and female functions is m ore difficult to 
estim ate than  the  num bers o f m ale and female 
offspring in  a dioecious species, and there  are 
additional reasons why herm aphroditism  tends 
to strike us as com plicated, even messy. But the  
herm aphroditic  model is actually m uch easier 
to solve th an  the D arw in-Fisher model, because 
the fitness differences associated w ith  different 
relative m ale investm ents appear sooner (in the  
first, offspring generation) ra ther th an  la ter (in 
the second, grandoffspring generation). Perhaps, 
if  hum an  beings were outbreeding sim ultaneous 
herm aphrodites, sex ratio  evolution would no t 
have baffled Darwin to  the  ex ten t th a t it  did.
Why are some species herm aphroditic  ra ther 
th an  dioecious? Various reasons have been sug­
gested, and m ost are plausible. For example, 
some herm aphrodites self-fertilize, and this per­
m its colonization of unoccupied habitats by 
single im m ature  individuals (e.g. seeds). Self­
fertilization also shifts the  ESS sex allocation 
strongly toward investm ent in  fem ale functions, 
th rough a principle closely related to  th a t o f local 
m ate com petition. By econom izing on m ale func­
tion, individuals can increase the ir genetic con­
tributions to  fu tu re  generations: in  effect, they 
escape part o f the ‘cost o f sex’ (e.g. Maynard 
Smith 1978).
However, m any plants are self-incompatible 
(outcrossing) sim ultaneous herm aphrodites. 
They pay the full cost o f sex, and they need 
unrelated  mates. W hat are the  benefits in  this
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case? One popular and well supported idea 
is th a t owing to  th e ir im m obility and their 
reliance on anim al vectors for pollination and/or 
seed dispersal, m any plants may experience 
d im inishing re tu rns on investm ent in  one or 
bo th  sex functions. In addition, the tem poral 
separation o f m ale and  fem ale functions may 
reduce the  degree to w hich those functions draw 
from  the  same pool o f  resources. Under such 
conditions, an  individual m ay be able to  achieve 
greater n e t reproduction by being partly  m ale 
and partly  fem ale th an  it could by devoting all 
o f its resources to ju s t  one sex function. In o ther 
words, the  constraint on  possible com binations of 
m ale and female reproduction may be nonlinear 
in  a way th a t m akes herm aphroditism  m ore 
efficient th an  dioecy.
This idea is often m odelled by representing 
an  individual’s realized or effective m ale and 
female reproductive outputs as arb itrary  powers 
of its in ternal resource allocations: m = xa and 
/  =  (1 — x)h. The exponent a controls the  shape 
o f the  function th a t scales reproductive returns 
on investm ent in  m ale function, and the expo­
n en t b scales re tu rns on fem ale investm ent. If a 
or b is less th an  1 , th en  the  corresponding sex 
function shows dim inishing retu rns to  scale, bu t 
if  a o r b is greater th an  1 , th en  the  corresponding 
function shows increasing re tu rns to  scale. For 
example, suppose a =  0.25 because pollinators 
are easily saturated , bu t b =  1  because fru its and 
th e ir  seeds w ill be eaten  by birds in  d irect pro­
portion  to  th e ir abundance and  th en  dispersed 
widely. The fitness set representing  possible com­
binations o f realized m ale and  female ou tputs 
(m and / ,  corresponding to  values o f x betw een
0 and  1 ) bends outw ard w ith  respect to  the ori­
gin, as shown in  Figure 1.4. This graph makes it 
easy to  see th a t herm aphrodites (individuals w ith 
some degree o f  mixed sex expression) will tend  to 
have larger to ta l reproductive ou tpu ts th an  pure 
m ales or pure females, because m + f  is clearly 
g reater for in term ediate  points on the  fitness set 
th an  it  is for points a t the  ends w here m or /  is 
zero. But w here exactly is the  ESS? The unbeat­
able allocation is no t obvious, because the  fitness 
set is no t symmetrical.
We can find the  ESS by w riting  a Shaw-M ohler 
equation for the  fitness o f a focal individual th a t 
allocates x to  m ale function  in  a population
Fitness set for a simple model of hermaphroditic 
sex allocation. The heavy curve shows possible combinations 
of male (m) and female ( f  ) reproductive outputs for a plant 
whose male gain exponent (o =  0.25) provides diminishing 
returns on investment in male function, while its female gain 
exponent (b =  I) provides linear returns. The equilibrium 
resource allocation (X * =  0.2) is highly female biased, as is 
the realized output o f male and female reproductive functions 
(m* =  0.67, f *  =  0.80), indicated by the filled circle. The 
light curves are hyperbolas representing constant values of 
the product mf. They can be viewed as a contour map, and 
they demonstrate that MacArthur’s ( 1965) principle applies to 
this model; the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) coincides 
with the highest value of m f  attainable on the fitness set.
w here the average allocation is X
W  =
" x“ (1 -  x)b 1
_X“ + (1 -X )bJ' (1.25)
W hen the  population-wide average allocation X 
is a t the evolutionary equilibrium , our focal in­
dividual should be unable to increase its fitness 
W  by choosing an allocation x th a t differs from  
X. In o ther words, W(x) should be m axim ized 
w hen x =  X. To find this unbeatable allocation 
we differentiate the  Shaw-M ohler equation  w ith  
respect to x, set the derivative equal to  zero, set 
x =  X, and th en  solve for X. Doing so gives the 
solution
X* =  — . • ; (1.26)
a + b . .
On substitu ting  the exponents discussed above 
(a =  0.25, b =  1) in to  this general solution we 
get X* =  0.20, w hich is highly female-biased 
w ith  respect to  resources invested and substan­
tially biased even w ith  respect to  the  resulting
22 JON SEGER & J. WILLIAM STUBBLEFIELD
reproductive ou tpu ts (m* =  0.67, /*  =  0.80) 
(Figure 1.4). The herm aphrodite’s fitness (W =  1) 
is substantially  greater th an  th a t achieved by a 
m ale (x =  1, W =  0.75) or a female (x =  0, W  = 
0.63), so herm aphroditism  is clearly stable 
against invasion by the pure sexes (Charnov et al. 
1976).
If the scaling exponents a and  b bo th  ex­
ceed 1 , th en  the  fitness set bends inw ard towards 
the origin and dioecy (with equal num bers of 
males and females) is evolutionarily stable. If 
one exponent is less th an  1  and the o ther is 
g reater th an  1 , th en  e ither androdioecy (males 
and  herm aphrodites) or gynodioecy (females and 
herm aphrodites) m aybe stable, depending on the 
exact values o f a and b (Charnov et al. 1976). 
This sim ple m odel has been extended in  m any 
ways to  reflect potentially  im portan t aspects of 
p lan t physiology, developm ent and ecology. For 
example, m odels have been studied th a t incor­
porate vegetative grow th betw een bouts o f re­
production, w ith  trade-offs betw een investm ent 
in  grow th (for fu tu re  reproduction) and  invest­
m en t in  reproduction (for cu rren t fitness); in  
some such m odels the regions o f param eter space 
supporting  gynodioecy and dioecy expand while 
those supporting androdioecy shrink, in  ways 
th a t may help  to  explain why androdioecy is very 
rare in  na tu re  (Seger & Eckhart 1996, Eckhart 
& Seger 1999). Plant sex-allocation strategies are 
fu rther com plicated by several o ther features of 
p lan t biologies including strong spatial popu­
la tion  structures, m ating  systems th a t involve 
m ixed selfing and outcrossing, and cytoplasmi- 
cally determ ined ‘m ale sterility’ (femaleness), 
w hich gives rise to  an  evolutionarily unstable bu t 
w idespread form  o f gynodioecy.
In 1941, the bo tan ist D. Lewis published an 
explicit population-genetic m odel for the rela­
tive frequencies and  fecundities o f females and 
herm aphrodites in  populations w here male- 
sterile individuals (females) are determ ined by 
genotypes a t a nuclear locus. He discovered 
th a t females cannot invade an  outbreeding 
herm aphroditic  population  unless they set a t 
least twice as m any seeds as a typical herm ­
aphrodite, th a t the  equilibrium  frequency o f fe­
m ales w ill approach one-half as herm aphrodites 
increase th e ir m ale function and decrease the ir 
fem ale function  (thereby becom ing male-like)
and th a t none o f this is affected by the dom i­
nance or recessiveness of the  alleles th a t convert 
herm aphrodites to  females. Lewis does no t cite 
Darwin, Diising, Fisher or any other previous sex 
ratio  theorist, and he does no t seem to realize 
th a t his m odel illum inates general issues in  sex 
allocation and represents a m ajor m ethodologi­
cal advance. The paper seems no t to  have been 
noticed by subsequent sex ra tio  theorists un til 
m uch later, after explicit genetic models had 
been reinvented.
1.11 I Conclusion: diversity in unity
Sex ratios evolve according to  simple, aestheti­
cally beautifu l principles, b u t they often affect 
and respond to  m any particu lar and even id­
iosyncratic aspects o f a species’ biology. Sex ra­
tio theory therefore establishes concrete links be­
tw een some o f the  m ost specific and some of 
the m ost general phenom ena in  biology, and it 
does so in  a rich and productive way. The theory 
also accom m odates a w ide variety of styles and 
techniques o f analysis th a t continue to grow in 
sophistication and rigour. Yet despite the  field’s 
ever-growing diversity in  these respects, its theo­
retical s tructure  is becom ing sim pler and m ore 
transparen t. The field as a whole is m uch larger 
th an  it once was because m ore is known, and 
in  m ore detail. But the central ideas and prin­
ciples seem m ore coherent, m ore clearly articu­
lated, and therefore easier to m aster th an  they 
were a few decades ago. As we stressed a t the  
outset, there is still a great deal to be done, both  
em pirically and theoretically, and  no one can pre­
dict w hat will tu rn  up  next. Sex touches alm ost 
eveiything, so the study o f  its allocation w ill lead 
us to  m any new problem s, and a large fraction 
o f these seem certain  to  be interdisciplinary.
For example, as genetics becomes increasingly 
genom ic in  scale, we are encouraged to  th ink  
in  increasingly concrete term s about the pos­
sibilities for in tragenom ic conflict over sex ra­
tios. W hen H am ilton in troduced this subject in  
the first h a lf  o f  his 1967 paper, it was little 
m ore th an  an abstract possibility supported by 
a few observations o f sex-chromosome m eiotic 
drive. Now, only 35 years later, we know the  ex­
act chrom osom al locations o f all the genes in
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several species’ genomes, and soon we w ill know 
w hen and w here these genes are expressed and at 
least som ething about the physiological proper­
ties o f  th e ir products. There are m any situations 
in  w hich sex-linked and  autosom al genes m ight 
‘disagree’ about the ir carrier’s paren tal invest­
m ents or o ther sex-biased in teractions w ith  kin. 
How are these conflicts ‘settled’? Our growing 
ability to observe bo th  the expression and  the 
evolution o f arbitrarily  large sets o f genes should 
bring new life to  bo th  the  theoretical and em pir­
ical aspects o f this very in teresting  problem.
On the  theoretical side, expected-future- 
fitness and population-genetic models will again 
play com plem entary roles. Obviously, w ith  spe­
cific genes in  m ind, i t  w ill be natu ra l and nec­
essary to  construct explicit multi-locus dynam ­
ical models th a t show how the in teractions o f 
alleles w ith  various different phenotypic effects 
m ight lead to  various alternative outcom es. Per­
haps less obviously, i t  will also be necessaiy to 
ask how neu tra l alleles a t typical loci, elsewhere 
in  the genome, m ight be affected by the pos­
sible outcom es o f the conflict. If different out­
comes are b etter and worse for large num bers of 
genes th roughou t the genome, then  such genes 
m igh t be recruited  in to  the  conflict as modifiers 
o f sm all effect. Because fitness-based models de­
scribe how particu lar sex-allocation phenotypes 
affect the  fu tu re  frequencies o f neu tra l genes as­
sociated w ith  those phenotypes, such models will 
be used to  study how the  genetic background a t 
large m ight be expected to respond to  particu lar 
genetic conflicts.
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